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I. INTRODUCTION
In the last Survey of this subject the author stated that the courts
had continued to decide cases without making any reference to the Uni-
form Commercial Code (UCC).I In the last two years the courts have
* Professor of Law, University of Miami. The materials surveyed herein extend from
250 So. 2d 257 through 283 So. 2d 102 and the legislation enacted by the 1972 and 1973
Regular and Special Sessions of the Florida Legislature.
1. Murray, Negotiable Instruments and Banking, 1969-1971 Survey of Florida Law, 26
U. MiAzI L. REv. 72 (1971).
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reversed this conduct and are now using the UCC with commendable
sophistication. The fact patterns in the decisions of the last biennium
seem more complex and varied than in previous years, and this is par-
ticularly true in the unauthorized indorsement, usury and bank collection
cases.
The legislative changes, with few exceptions, seem to be special
interest enactments for the benefit of banks and savings and loan asso-
ciations. In a somewhat inconsistent vein, the Florida Legislature in-
creased the loan limits for small loan companies and this will enable
these companies to compete with banks.' This legislation paid lip service
to the interests of the consumer by abolishing the holder in due course
doctrine in small loan consumer transactions. Inasmuch as the Florida
courts have previously eviscerated the doctrine,' this gesture towards the
consumer is more a bone than a boon.
II. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS
A. Jurisdiction
In Southwest Cycle Sales, Inc. v. Gold Key Marketing, Inc.,4 a
promissory note was given by a non-resident of Florida for partial pay-
ment of goods. The note provided that it was deemed to have been made
in Dade County, Florida, and that the Secretary of State of Florida was
appointed agent for service of process in the event of default by the
maker. The maker defaulted; service was made upon the Secretary of
State, who accepted it (even though he could have refused it), and copies
of the complaint were mailed to the maker. The District Court of Appeal,
Third District, held that valid service was made in accordance with the
maker's contract.
A Florida husband and wife who journeyed to Ohio to cosign their
son's promissory note in Ohio as accommodation makers are subject to
Ohio's long arm statute which provides for jurisdiction over any person
"transacting any business in this state."'
B. Standing to Sue
Foreign corporations may sue on notes which are executed and
delivered in Florida without qualifying to do business in this state.'
2. Fla. Laws, 1973, ch. 73-192, creating FIA. STAT. § 516.31(2).
3. E.g., Mutual Fin. Co. v. Martin, 63 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 1953); Rehurek v. Chrysler
Credit Corp., 262 So. 2d 452 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972); National State Bank v. Robert Richter
Hotel, Inc., 186 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966) and 188 So. 2d 18 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966); and
Industrial Credit Co. v. Mike Bradford & Co., 177 So. 2d 878 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
4. 265 So. 2d 390 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
5. Einhorn v. Home State Say. Ass'n, 256 So. 2d 57 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971).
6. Al Wilson's Power-Ful Displays, Inc. v. Morgan Adhesive, Inc., 259 So. 2d 166 (Fla.
3d Dist. 1972).
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C. Conflicts of Law
The District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, has held that when
a promissory note is payable in New Jersey, the substantive law of that
state governs a suit in Florida to enfore the note.'
D. Consideration
When a maker pleads want of consideration, it is not error for the
trial court to refuse to charge the jury as to the defense of a partial
failure of consideration."
E. Illegality
The District Court of Appeals, Fourth District, has characterized
the sale of directorships in Koscot Interplanetary, Inc. as pyramid
franchising agreements under section 849.091 of the Florida Statutes
and held that a promissory note which was given as consideration for
these directorships was void and unenforceable in the hands of an im-
mediate party to the transaction.9 It is to be wondered if the court would
have held this note to be "void" if it had been in the hands of a holder
in due course?' 0
F. Coverture
Article X, section 5 of the 1968 Constitution of the State of Florida
provides that there shall be no distinction between married women and
married men in the holding, control, disposition or encumbering of their
property. Article XI, section 1 of the 1885 constitution provided that
the wife's separate property was not liable for the debts of her husband
"without her consent given by some instrument in writing executed ac-
cording to the law respecting conveyances by married women." The
Supreme Court of Florida has held that the 1885 constitutional provision
was repealed by the 1968 constitution, and, as a result, a wife who signed
a simple promissory note and gave it to a hospital for hospitalization,
medicine and services rendered to her husband was liable on it."
7. Schaufelberger v. Mister Softee, Inc., 259 So. 2d 175 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972). This case
also involved a comparison of pre-Code Florida and New Jersey case law pursuant to sec-
tion 20 of the UNiroRM NEGOTiABLE INsTRuaMENTS LAW, FLA. STAT. § 674.22 (1963).
8. Holm v. Woodworth, 271 So. 2d 167 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972).
9. Frye v. Taylor, 263 So. 2d 835 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972).
10. Section 3-305(2)(c) of the UCC provides that a holder in due course takes an in-
strument subject to the defense of illegality which renders the obligation of a par y a nullity.
11. Hallman v. Hospital & Welfare Bd., 262 So. 2d 669 (Fla. 1972). Former section
708.02 of the Florida Statutes (1969) provided that a married woman's separate property
should not be liable for the debts of her husband "without her consent given by some instru-
ment in writing executed according to the law respecting conveyances by married women."
Article X section 5 of the 1968 Florida Constitution provides that there shall be no distinc-
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G. Completion of Instrument
Section 3-115(1) of the UCC received an unusual application in
O'Connell v. Citizens National Bank. 2 The payees sued the makers, and
the trial court dismissed the complaint because the note was incomplete.
The payees then filed an amended complaint accompanied by a com-
pleted promissory note, and the complaint alleged that the payees had
completed the note in accordance with the authority given by the makers.
The trial court entered judgment in favor of the payees, and the appel-
late court, without deciding that the trial court may have been in error
in sustaining the amended complaint for facts which occurred after the
filing of the original complaint, stated that the makers were in no differ-
ent position than they would have been if the payees had voluntarily
dismissed the original action, completed the instrument and thereafter
had filed a subsequent action on the completed note. As a consequence,
if there was error, it did not prejudice the makers.
H. Agency
Agency law often becomes interwoven with bills and notes ques-
tions. For example, in Anderson, Bryan & Campbell, Inc. v. First Na-
tional Bank"3 the president of a bank was also vice-president of a
customer-corporation. This individual had actual authority to draw
checks on the corporation's account in the bank in payment of his per-
sonal expenses, as did the other officer and stockholder of the corpora-
tion. On one occasion, the vice-president received a large check payable
to the corporation, stamped the bank's indorsement upon it, deposited
it in the bank and then misapplied some of the proceeds. The corpora-
tion sued the bank for conversion on the theory that the defalcating in-
dividual was acting as agent for the bank and that the bank, therefore,
was liable. The trial court held for the bank and the District Court of
Appeal, Second District, affirmed upon the basis that it was a question
of fact as to whether the defalcating individual was acting primarily
under the authority granted him as an officer and part owner of the cor-
poration rather than in his capacity as president of the bank.
I. Unauthorized Signatures
Section 3-404 of the UCC provides that any unauthorized signature
is wholly inoperative as that of the person whose name is signed unless
tion between married women and married men in the holding, disposition, etc. of property.
The District Court of Appeal, Third District, has held that this statute is inconsistent with
the 1968 Florida Constitution and was not preserved in effect, with the result that a mar-
ried woman was held liable on her signature on a note which was signed without any for-
malities after the adoption of the 1968 Constitution and before the repeal of section 708.02.
Embart Corp. v. Brantley, 257 So. 2d 273 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
12. 254 So. 2d 236 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971).
13. 258 So. 2d 819 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972).
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he ratifies it "or is precluded from denying it." An unusual application
of this section was involved in Wall v. Hamilton County Bank.14 Part-
ners who were engaged in the operation of a tobacco sales warehouse
entered into an arrangement with their drawee bank which provided that
the partners "hereby [waive] identification on all farmers' checks issued
for the payment of tobacco and [guarantee] ... [the bank] against loss
for payment of such checks without identification of [the] party pre-
senting the check for payment."'" The partners would, in the course of
their business, issue checks to payees whose names were written on the
checks in longhand. The signatures of the employee authorized to sign
the checks were written by use of a facsimle signature; the amount of
the checks and the dates were written by a machine. Two checks were
stolen and filled in with the machine, and cashed with the drawee bank.
The District Court of Appeal, First District, held that in light of the con-
tract between the partnership and its drawee bank, the partners were
precluded as a matter of law from asserting that the checks were un-
authorized in a suit against the bank, and the summary judgment by
the trial court was affirmed.
Section 3-116 of the UCC provides that when an instrument is pay-
able to two or more persons jointly, it may be negotiated, discharged or
enforced only by all of the joint payees. A district court of appeal has
held that when a joint payee sued the bank cashing such a check on the
grounds that his name was forged and that the bank, therefore, con-
verted the check (under section 3-419 of the Code), the bank can defend
upon the basis that the proceeds of the check "went where they were
intended."'" This defense can be proven only after a full trial and not
during summary judgment proceedings.
When insurance company drafts are payable through a bank, that
bank is a collecting bank and not a drawee bank under section 3-120 of
the UCC. As a result, when a joint payee forges the names of his co-
payees on these drafts and collection is made through the bank named
on the draft and through a depository-collecting bank, these banks are
liable in a conversion action by the defrauded payees only for the
amount of the proceeds of the draft still in the possession of the col-
lecting banks. 7 If the forger has withdrawn all of the proceeds from his
depository bank, then neither this bank nor an intermediate collecting
bank is liable for any amount.'8
In a factually confused case, the District Court of Appeal, Second
14. 276 So. 2d 182 (Fla. Ist Dist. 1973).
15. Id. at 182.
16. Sullivan v. Wilton Manors Nat'l Bank, 259 So. 2d 194, 195 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972).
See Murray, Joint Payee Checks-Forged and Missing Indorsements, 78 Cox. L.J. 393
(1973).
17. UCC § 3-419(3).
18. Messeroff v. Kantor, 261 So. 2d 553 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972). See Murray, Drafts "Pay-
able Through" Banks, 77 Cosr. L.J. 389 (1972).
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District, 9 has held that a bank which has issued a cashier's check pay-
able to a husband and wife may refuse to honor the check when it is
presented by another bank which cashed the check at the request of the
husband, who signed his wife's name and indicated this fact ("Grace
Grimaldi by Richard Grimaldi"). The majority opinion failed to cite
any authority and also uttered some inaccurate dicta regarding the cash-
ing of cashier's checks made payable to bearer. Judge Mann, in a sep-
arate opinion, noted that the check had not been "cashed," but that it
had been credited to the joint checking account of the parties, for which
the husband had sufficient authority under the terms of the deposit of
the check. It is the author's opinion that Judge Mann is correct.
A bonding company which has indemnified a corporate drawer
whose employee forged the drawer's name to checks and which has re-
ceived an assignment of rights from the drawer may sue the drawee
bank under conventional subrogation principles. The drawee bank is
liable for paying checks bearing the forged signatures of its customer-
drawers. The claim of the bonding company under "conventional subro-
gation"2 principles should not be defeated by the "equitable subroga-
tion"'2 defense that since the bonding company is a paid surety and the
bank has been guilty of no more fault than the surety, the bonding com-
pany is precluded from recovering from the bank on the basis that the
equities were equal.
J. Usury
The Supreme Court of Florida in reversing the District Court of
Appeal, Fourth District,22 has held that in order to prove the defense
of usury it is necessary to allege and prove that the lender had a corrupt
intent to exact usurious interest, and that this corrupt intent cannot be
proved solely by showing that mathematical computations result in ex-
cess interest being exacted.
In a prior decision involving the same case, the district court had
also held that in order for a court to find that a loan is usurious there
must exist an intent by the lender to willfully and knowingly take more
than the legal rate of interest for the use of the money loaned. This
knowing intent, however, is not disclaimed by the testimony of the
lender that he did not know the legal rate of interest in Florida, because
everyone is presumed to know the law. However, the mere fact that the
interest charged exceeds the legal limit is not enough to prove this in-
tent to charge usurious interest; there must be an inquiry into the entire
transaction in order to establish corrupt intent.23
19. Beach Nat'l Bank v. Bank of Hollywood Hills, 256 So. 2d 251 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971).
20. Dispatch Services, Inc. v. Airport Bank, 266 So. 2d 127 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
21. Id.
22. Dixon v. Sharp, 276 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 1973), rev'g 265 So. 2d 105 (Fla. 4th Dist.
1972).
23. Sharp v. Dixon, 252 So. 2d 805 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971).
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The Supreme Court of Florida has reversed the holding in Fields
v. Wilensky,24 which was discussed in the last Survey,25 and has held
that usury statutes which provide for criminal penalties for usurious
transactions including forfeiture of principal and interest are not to be
applied ex post facto to transactions which occurred prior to the effective
date of the statute. The court further held that section 67.071 (the loan
sharking statute) did not impliedly repeal section 67.11 of the Florida
Statutes (1971), as was held by the district court in Wilensky.
An assignment of accounts receivable from a retail furniture dealer
to a finance company may constitute either a sale of accounts or an as-
signment as collateral for a loan. If it is the latter and the amount of the
"discounts" charged by the finance company exceeds the statutory in-
terest rate, a usurious loan may be present. In a recent case, the court
held that when the transaction between the retail furniture dealer and
the finance company provided for a right of recourse against the dealer
if retail customers failed to pay; that the furniture company guaranteed
payment of each account; that it provided for a security interest in
present and after acquired accounts; that subsequent accounts were
assigned to the finance company, etc., it was sufficient to show that a
loan rather than an outright sale was involved. The court further held
that even though the loan might not have been usurious at its inception,
it might have been at any time during the relationship between the furn-
iture store debtor and the finance company. 6
The Supreme Court of Florida has held that when a lender sues a
borrower on an allegedly usurious loan and the parties stipulate that the
defense of usury will be withdrawn and a renewal note is then entered
into between the parties, this stipulation is binding upon the basis of a
"waiver" and usury cannot be pleaded as a defense to a suit on the re-
newal note. In this particular case, the stipulation and renewal agree-
ment seemed to give the lender certain advantages (such as the added
guaranty of the note by the wife of the individual signing the note, etc.)
not found in the first loan agreement, and this case would seem to be
questionable.2 7
When a mortgagor raises the defense of usury in a mortgage fore-
closure action, it is relevant for him to submit interrogatories to the
mortgagee-plaintiff inquiring, over the objections of the lender that they
were irrelevant and immaterial, about loans made by the mortgagee to
other borrowers, because he might discover usurious transactions with
others which would be admissable evidence to possibly establish the
24. Wilensky v. Fields, 267 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1972), rev'g 247 So. 2d 477 (Fla. 4th Dist.
1971).
25. Murray, Negotiable Instruments and Banking, 1969-1971 Survey of Florida Law,
26 U. MrAm L. REv. 72 (1971).
26. W.B. Dunn Co. v. Mercantile Credit Corp., 275 So. 2d 311 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1973).
27. Gunn Plumbing, Inc. v. Dania Bank, 252 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1971). See the very strong
dissent of Justice Dekle.
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lender's "general modus operandi and its authorship of the loan docu-
ments, 28
Section 95.11(6) provides for a two-year statute of limitations for
the recovery of usurious interest, and section 687.04 of the Florida
Statutes (1971) provides that forfeiture of usurious interest may occur
after it has been paid. As a result, when an action is brought within two
years after the payment of the usurious interest, the suit is timely even
though more than two years have elapsed since the loan was in default.29
Usury is a creature of statute and punitive damages are not allowed
in addition to the statutory penalties and forfeitures. 80
The defense of usury cannot be sustained in a suit brought in Florida
to enforce an Indiana note whose interest rate is in accordance with the
Indiana small loan law and no greater than that permitted by Florida
law under its Small Loan Act."1
K. Payment and Accord and Satisfaction
The plaintiff-holder of a promissory note does not have the initial
burden of proving that the note remains unpaid; the burden is on the
defendant to affirmatively allege and prove that the note has been paid. 82
Possession of an uncancelled note raises a rebuttable presumption of non-
payment, and the burden of proving payment is upon the party assert-
ing payment.38
The facts in Rock Springs Land Co. v. West3 4 resemble a law school
examination question. A buyer under an agreement for deed transaction
asked the vendor to inform her of the balance owing. The vendor looked
at the wrong amortization table and told the buyer that the balance was
$446.57 rather than the true balance of $2,561.17. The buyers delivered
their check for $446.57 to the vendor, and the check was marked "paid
in full." The vendor accepted the check and gave a deed to the buyers.
Subsequently, the vendor discovered his mistake and brought suit for
the remaining balance. The District Court of Appeal, Fourth District,
held that the unilateral mistake of the vendor was not the result of an
inexcusable lack of due care and that the buyers did not rely upon it to
their detriment. There was no basis in the evidence that the parties had
reached an accord and satisfaction nor that the parties intended that
the $446.57 was to be payment in full, and the buyers were liable for
the difference.
28. Continental Mtg. Investors v. Village by the Sea, Inc., 252 So. 2d 833, 835 (Fla.
4th Dist. 1971).
29. Vance v. Florida Reduction Corp., 263 So. 2d 585 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972).
30. Moretto v. Sussman, 274 So. 2d 259 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973).
31. Cardaman v. ABC Fin. Corp., 264 So. 2d 53 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
32. Touchberry v. Nemec, 264 So. 2d 466 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972).
33. Speier v. Lane, 254 So. 2d 823 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
34. 281 So. 2d 555 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973).
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L. Interest
A trial court judge does not have the power to assess interest on a
promissory note when the plaintiff-holder failed to ask the court to in-
struct the jury to award interest, the court has not charged the jury in
this regard and the jury has simply returned a verdict which does not
mention interest . 5 On the other hand, when a jury returns a verdict
which provides that the plaintiff-holder of a note is to receive principal
"plus interest,"8 it is permissible for the trial court judge to make the
mathematical computations of the interest. It is, however, better practice
for the jury to make the computations and to articulate the amount of
the interest in its verdict.
M. Lost Instruments
In an action which is brought under chapter 71 of the Florida Stat-
utes (1971) to reestablish a lost note and real property mortgage, the
makers of the note and mortgage are entitled to assurance that the note
and mortgage have not been assigned. A district court has held that
this assurance has not been made if the plaintiff merely stated that the
instruments had not been assigned when it was admitted that other notes
and mortgages held by it had been assigned to various parties.87 The
court failed to mention section 3-804 of the UCC which provides that
the court may require indemnity securing the makers of the lost note
against loss by reason of further claims on the instrument.
N. Set-off
In a suit brought by the payee of a promissory note against the
maker, it is proper for the maker to counterclaim and set-off against the
amount claimed, sums of money which may be owed by the payee to
the maker on entirely unrelated transactions.8
0. Parol Testimony
In accordance with section 3-403(2)(b) of the UCC, the District
Court of Appeal, Second District, has held that when a check was
signed
JIMMY SPEERS AUTO AUCTION
Bruce A. Ryals [longhand]
Ann Marie Speer [machine]
35. Grayson v. Fishlove, 266 So. 2d 38 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
36. Cantor v. Drapkin, 251 So. 2d 542, 543 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
37. Shores v. First Fla. Resource Corp., 267 So. 2d 696 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972).
38. Burton v. Citizens Bank, 273 So. 2d 91 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1973).
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parol testimony was admissible when the payee sued Mrs. Speer per-
sonally on the check to show that Mrs. Speer signed as treasurer of the
company and that she never undertook to personally "guarantee" (pay)
the check, despite the words "GUARANTEED CHECKS" in the mar-
gin." It should be noted that this suit was between the "immediate
parties" (i.e., the payee was suing a drawer of the check) and parol
evidence is admissible in this instance. If the check had been indorsed
to a third party, parol evidence would not have been admissible under
section 3-403(2)(b) of the UCC to show the capacity in which the de-
fendant signed.
P. Holder in Due Course and Value
In Fernandez v. Cunningham4° suit was brought against the estate
of a deceased maker of a note who had given it to a corporation which
had indorsed the note to its attorneys as payment for legal services. The
maker's estate asserted defenses against the payee, and the attorneys
claimed to be holders in due course. The plaintiff-attorneys moved for
summary judgment and filed an affidavit which merely stated that the
note was indorsed to them for attorney's fees, without any evidence as
to the nature, extent and value of the legal services rendered prior to
the acquisition of the note. The trial court entered a summary judgment
in favor of the plaintiff-attorneys, but the District Court of Appeal,
Third District, reversed on the ground that the attorneys would be
holders for value only to the extent of the value of services rendered
prior to the receipt of the note and that they had failed to submit any
evidence of the value of their services.
Q. Holder in Due Course From a Holder in Due Course
A holder who has holder in due course status as a successor to a
holder in due course,4" having reacquired the instrument after partici-
pating fully in the underlying transactions, and having received actual
knowledge of the discharge of one of the parties to the instrument, takes
subject to that defense of discharge.42
R. Attorneys' Fees
The District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, has held that an
award of attorney's fees in the amount of $5,000 for services rendered
in a relatively uncomplicated suit on a promissory note for $10,000 plus
interest was excessive, and the amount was reduced to $2,500.48
39. Speer v. Friedland, 276 So. 2d 84 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973).
40. 268 So. 2d 166 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
41. UCC § 3-201(1).
42. Coplan Pipe & Supply Co. v. Ben-Frieda Corp., 256 So. 2d 218 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
43. Transportation Mgmt. Co. v. Druck, 279 So. 2d 88 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973).
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S. Legislation
The Small Loan Business Act has been extensively amended and
renamed the Consumer Finance Law."' Small loan companies may now
lend up to $2,500 with maximum interest of 30 percent per annum on
the first $300, 24 percent per annum on the next $300, and 16 percent
per annum on the next $1,900. Interest shall be simple and not add-on
interest or other computations, and must be computed in accordance
with the Federal Truth in Lending Act and Regulation Z of the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve Board.48 In addition to a variety
of other amendments, the holder in due course doctrine governing secu-
rity interests has been abolished; a holder or assignee from the small
loan company is now subject to all defenses of the consumer-debtor
against the seller of those consumer goods or services.4" If a creditor
takes possession of goods which were subject to a consumer transaction,
the consumer shall not be liable for a deficiency unless the unpaid bal-
ance of the consumer transaction at the time of default was in the amount
of $2,000 or more.47 The rights of lenders to obtain and retain security
interests in "cross collateral" were also limited.48
Under an amendment to the usury statutes, it is now permissible to
charge a maximum of fifteen percent per annum interest to an individual
for a loan of money exceeding five hundred thousand dollars in amount.49
Upon first glance, it might appear that this statute would not receive
daily application. It is suggested, however, that this statute will be widely
followed in cases wherein individuals sign as guarantors of promissory
notes executed by corporate borrowers.
III. MORTGAGES AND SECURITY INTERESTS
A. Statute of Frauds
The District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, has held that a suit
by a borrower against a lender upon an oral contract to lend money in
return for the borrower giving a note and mortgage to the lender is not
barred by the statute of frauds, because the giving of a mortgage in
Florida does not transfer any title or interest other than a lien in real
estate. The reader is cautioned that this decision would seem to place
Florida in the minority column on this point.5"
44. FLA. STAT. ch. 516 (1973) [Committee Substitute for S.B. No. 835 (1973)].
45. FLA. STAT. § 516.031 (1973).
46. FLA. STAT. § 516.31(2) (1973).
47. FLA. STAT. § 516.31(3) (1973).
48. FLA. STAT. § 516.31(4) (1973).
49. Fla. Laws 1973 ch. 73-298, amending FLA. STAT. §§ 687.02, .03 (1971).
50. Martyn v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 257 So. 2d 576 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971). Com-
pare 2 A. CORB N, CONTRACTS § 403 (1950, Supp. 1971) uith G. OSBORNE, MORTG'AGES
§§ 131-34 (1951) and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 195 (1973).
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B. Merger
As a general rule, when a mortgagor conveys the equity of redemp-
tion to the mortgagee, the mortgage ceases to be an incumbrance under
the theory of a merger."
C. Insurable Interest
Under a breach of warranty clause (also known as a standard
mortgage or union clause) in a policy of casualty insurance which is de-
signed to insure the interests of the mortgagor and mortgagee, it is not
necessary for the mortgagor to be an "owner" of the mortgaged proper-
ty in order for the mortgagee to recover in case of loss. It is necessary,
however, that the mortgagor have an insurance interest in the property;
otherwise, the insurance policy will be construed as an illegal wager and
the mortgagee will be unable to recover. 52
D. Jurisdiction
When a mortgage foreclosure action is brought in a state court prior
to the institution of bankruptcy proceedings involving the mortgagor,
the state court has jurisdiction. The decree of foreclosure cannot be at-
tacked in a collateral proceeding if the bankruptcy court enters a re-
straining order against the mortgagee which is ignored by him and never
asserted by the mortgagor in the state court. 3
E. Joinder of Parties
It is not necessary to join beneficiaries of a land trust as defendants
in a mortgage foreclosure action; however, these beneficiaries may be
joined as defendants under rule 1.210(c) of the Florida Rules of Civil
Procedure, and they may appear and defend the action in the event that
the trustee fails to do so.5"
When a defendant in a mortgage foreclosure action denies in her
answer that the other defendants owned the real estate which they mort-
gaged (and claims that she is the owner of the property), it is reversible
error to enter a judgment of foreclosure in the absence of proof that the
mortgagors did in fact own the subject property.5
F. Acceleration
When a court orders that a mortgagor should have an opportunity to
bring his payments up to date prior to the court's judgment for the entire
51. Floorcraft Distrib., Inc. v. Home-Wilson, Inc., 251 So. 2d 138 (Fla. Ist Dist. 1971).
52. Airvac, Inc. v. Ranger Ins. Co., 266 So. 2d 178 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972).
53. American Calmal Corp. v. Alderman, 264 So. 2d 454 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
54. Cowen v. Knott, 252 So. 2d 400 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971).
SS. Epstein v. Deerfield Beach Bank & Trust Co., 280 So. 2d 690 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973).
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accelerated amount but the mortgagor fails to pay the current payments,
he is in no position to complain that the court permitted the acceleration
of the entire indebtedness of the mortgage.56
In accordance with section 3-119 of the UCC, the District Court
of Appeal, Fourth District, has held that a note and mortgage should be
construed together in order to determine the intent of the parties as to
acceleration rights of the holder, and that the acceleration provision in
the mortgage should control the clauses of the note regarding accelera-
tion since the mortgage provided "anything in said note or herein to the
contrary notwithstanding. '5 7
In the eyes of the District Court of Appeal, Second District, it is
unconscionable for a second mortgagee to accelerate payment of the sec-
ond mortgage because the second mortgagee had paid two monthly pay-
ments to the first mortgagee upon default of the mortgagor when he had
failed to make a bona fide effort to reach the mortgagor about the default
and the facts failed to indicate that the first mortgagee intended to im-
mediately foreclose.58
In the absence of any material acts committed by the mortgagees
which might have misled the mortgagors, the mortgagees have a legiti-
mate right to accelerate the entire principal balance of the mortgage one
month after a default in a mortgage payment has been made by the
mortgagors. The fact that it will cost the mortgagors a higher interest
rate in borrowing funds to pay the accelerated mortgage is not enough
to preclude the acceleration. 9
A court may deny acceleration of a note and mortgage under proper
circumstances even though the mortgagors were in default; however,
the mortgagors may then be liable for attorney's fees which were in-
curred by the mortgagee as a result of the mortgagors' default.60
G. Estoppel
Interesting aspects of legal estoppel and the rights of an assignee
to a mortgage were illustrated in Dubbin v. Capital National Bank."
A corporation conveyed land by a general warranty deed to a grantee.
The land was subject to an existing mortgage, but no mention was made
of this fact, and the contract of sale called for the grantor to deliver a
title insurance policy to the grantee showing that the property was free
of any liens. Subsequently, the mortgagee assigned the note and mort-
gage to the grantor, who subsequently assigned them to its assignee. The
assignee then sued to foreclose, and the grantee counterclaimed to quiet
56. Jay Bar Dan Corp. v. Maran Washing, Inc., 277 So. 2d 811 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
57. Grier v. M.H.C. Realty Corp., 274 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973). This rule is in-
applicable to a bolder in due course who takes without notice of a limitation of his rights on
the instrument contained in the separate agreement. UCC § 3-119.
58. Walsh v. Combs, 255 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971).
59. Guynn v. Brentmoore Farms, Inc., 253 So. 2d 136 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971).
60. Rockwood v. DeRosa, 279 So. 2d 54 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973).
61. 264 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1972).
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title to the property. The court held that when the grantor conveyed a
defective title and then subsequently acquired the title which he had
purported to convey, the perfected title inured to the grantee. In addi-
tion, since the grantor was estopped to assert the mortgage against its
grantee, the assignee of the mortgage could not acquire any greater rights
and was also estopped to assert the mortgage against the grantee of the
property.
H. Election of Remedies
The Supreme Court of Florida has held that an election to sue on
a mortgage note and the receipt of a judgment which remains unsatisfied
does not act as a bar to a subsequent suit for foreclosure of the mort-
gage.6 2
A mortgage lien is not extinguished until the mortgage debt is
satisfied, and, as a result, a holder of a note and mortgage may sue on
the note in a law action and if payment of the judgment is not forth-
coming he may then sue to foreclose the mortgage. The defense of elec-
tion of remedies is not a bar to the subsequent foreclosure action in the
absence of payment.6 8
I. Foreclosure Sales
When an appealing mortgagor fails to obtain a supersedeas of a
judgment of foreclosure, the trial court may proceed with the fore-
closure sale of the property. If the judgment of foreclosure is reversed
upon appeal, the trial court should set the sale aside if the property was
purchased by the mortgagee at the sale. On the other hand, if a bona
fide third party purchases the land at the foreclosure sale, he will be pro-
tected even though the decree of foreclosure is held invalid as between
the mortgagor and mortgagee.64
Judicial sales for the foreclosures of mortgages will not be set
aside for slight defects or merely technical irregularities. However, when
the trial court ordered a mortgagor to pay certain monies to the mort-
gagee within a five-day period while the estate of the mortgagor was
within the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court and the mortgagor was
unable to comply with the trial court's order; then the trial court sub-
sequently proceeded on the basis that there had been a default judgment
entered against the mortgagor when it had not been, and the court then
ordered the clerk to sell the property pursuant to a statute which had
been repealed six months previously, etc., the totality of the errors re-
62. Junction Bit & Tool Co. v. Village Apts., Inc., 262 So. 2d 659 (Fla. 1972).
63. Floorcraft Distrib., Inc. v. Home-Wilson, Inc., 251 So. 2d 138 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971).
64. Sundie v. Haren, 253 So. 2d 857 (Fla. 1971), dismissing petition for cert., 233 So.
2d 417 (Fla. 3d Dist.).
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quired that the appellate court set the sale aside and remand the entire
case to the trial court for further proceedings."'
J. Redemption
In a case decided under former section 45.031 of the Florida Stat-
utes (1969) (which allowed redemption of mortgaged real property to
be made within ten days after the foreclosure sale), the District Court
of Appeal, Third District, held that when a junior mortgagee is not a
party to the proceeding, the purchaser at the foreclosure sale takes the
premises subject to the omitted junior mortgagee's right to redeem from
the first mortgagee. This right of redemption could be exercised until
the sale is confirmed by the execution and filing of a certificate of title."6
In a case of first impression in Florida, the District Court of Appeal,
Fourth District, has held that when lands are sold in accordance with
a foreclosure judgment but subsequently are redeemed by the mortgagors
prior to vesting of title in the buyer by the filing of the clerk's deed,




In the event that the holder of a third mortgage exercises his right
to redeem the mortgaged property and proceeds to foreclose the second
mortgage, purchases the property at the foreclosure sale (under section
702.02 of the Florida Statutes), and subsequently brings an action on
the mortgage note, the third mortgagor is entitled to assert as a pro tanto
equitable defense that the property had a fair market value at the time
of foreclosure in excess of the sum of the prior encumbrances.68
Section 9-504(3) of the UCC provides that when a secured creditor
takes possession of collateral, it must give the debtor notice of the time
and place of any public sale or reasonable notification of the time after
which any private sale is to be made. The District Court of Appeal, Sec-
ond District, has held that when a creditor fails to give this required
notice to the debtor, the creditor may not hold the debtor (a maker of a
promissory note) liable for any deficiency. 9 It should be pointed out
that some courts have held that when notice is not given the creditor
may recover a deficiency unless the debtor proves that the failure to
give him notice caused damage."
65. U-M Publishing, Inc. v. Home News Pub. Co., Inc., 279 So. 2d 379 (Fla. 3d Dist.
1973).
66. Akeley v. Miller, 264 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972). The statute was amended in
1971 to limit redemption to before sale, rather than filing of the certificate of title ten days
later. FLA. STAT. § 45.03(1) (1971).
67. Roy v. Matheson, 263 So. 2d 604 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972).
68. Ogle v. Pepin, 253 So. 2d 270 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971).
69. Turk v. St. Petersburg Bank & Trust Co., 281 So. 2d 534 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973).
70. E.g., Weaver v. O'Meara Motor Co., 452 P.2d 87 (Alaska 1969); Universal C.T.
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L. Relief From Foreclosure Judgment
Rule 1.540(b) of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure provides
that relief from a judgment may be obtained upon the basis that the
prior judgment upon which the judgment is based has been reversed or
otherwise vacated. In Riley v. Gustinger,71 Riley retained Gustinger as
his attorney in a law suit and gave Gustinger a note and mortgage for
$2,500 to secure payment of the legal fees. The judge in the lawsuit
awarded a fee of $1,600, and the client appealed. While the appeal was
pending, Gustinger foreclosed the note and mortgage. Subsequent to
the foreclosure, the appellate court reversed the original award of at-
torney's fees and the client sought to have the foreclosure judgment va-
cated upon the basis of the appellate decision. The District Court of
Appeal, Third District, held that in light of the rule, the foreclosure
judgment would be vacated and a new trial awarded in order to deter-
mine the amount of legal fees owed by Riley to Gustinger.
M. Subrogation
An interesting aspect of subrogation was involved in Fortenberry
v. Mandell. 2 Owners of land leased it for 99 years and the lease pro-
vided that the lessee would improve the property and that the improve-
ments were to belong to the owners upon the termination of the lease.
The lease also provided that if the lessee should borrow money to im-
prove the property, the owners would join in any mortgage encumber-
ing the land and the improvements. The lessee executed a note and mort-
gage, and the owners paid it. The lessee also defaulted on the lease, and
the owners took possession. The owners then brought suit against the
lessee on the basis of subrogation. The court held that the owners' pay-
ment of the note to the creditor entitled the owners to subrogation in
equity to the position of the creditor. The owners succeeded to all rights
of the creditor, which would include the right to recover a legal judg-
ment on the note. The owners were also entitled to reasonable attorney's
fees to be fixed by the trial court.
The case of First National Bank v. Cooper7a presented a complex
problem of first impression in Florida dealing with subrogation, mort-
gages and estates by the entirety. A widower purchased a home and as-
sumed payment of an existing mortgage which encumbered the premises.
On the following day he married, and approximately one week later he
conveyed the home property to himself and his wife as an estate by the
entirety. The new wife never assumed payment of the existing mortgage.
Credit Co. v. Rone, 453 S.W.2d 37 (Ark. 1970); Grant County Tractor Co. v. Nuss, 6 Wash.
App. 866, 496 P.2d 966 (1972).
71. 252 So. 2d 583 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
72. 271 So. 2d 170 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972).
73. 266 So. 2d 191 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972).
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The husband later died, and the mortgagee filed claim against the estate.
The mortgagee then assigned the mortgage to an assignee who filed a
claim against the estate in her own right. Subsequently, the assignee sued
the estate and secured a judgment against it. The administrator of the
estate then filed suit for a declaratory judgment to determine whether
if the administrator should pay the judgment obtained by the assignee,
the estate would be subrogated to the lien of the mortgage against the
property or entitled to a lien upon the mortgaged property to secure in-
demnity for payment of the judgment. The District Court of Appeal,
Second District, held that the note and mortgage were the sole obliga-
tion of the deceased husband (the wife never having assumed payment);
that if the husband had paid the debt during his lifetime he would not
have had any claim against his wife; and that the administrator of his
estate should not be given any greater rights than those possessed by the
deceased husband. The court cited a Connecticut case which held (on
somewhat similar facts) that the widow would be entitled to exoneration
by her deceased husband's estate from the mortgage debt. It would ap-
pear that the holding of the Florida court in favor of the wife in this
declaratory judgment action would result in a judgment closely resemb-
ling an exoneration judgment which compels the estate to exonerate the
widow's real property from the mortgage lien.
N. Reforeclosure Against Junior Lien Holders
When a mortgagee forecloses his mortgage and junior lien holders
are inadvertently omitted as defendants in the suit, the mortgagee may
subsequently institute another foreclosure action against the junior lien
holders, and the mortgage will be reinstated and then foreclosed against
these defendants.74
0. Accommodation Parties
It would appear that if a holder of a note should accept payments
of 2-1/2 percent rather than the agreed 5 percent from the maker, this
may constitute a material alteration sufficient to discharge a guarantor
of the note; at least this defense of alteration is sufficient to withstand
a motion to strike filed by the holder of the note. 5 However, the Su-
preme Court of Florida reversed on the ground that the guarantors had
agreed in the guaranty agreement that extensions, renewal, alterations,
amendments or waivers of any of the provisions of the promissory note,
including the method, manner, amount and times of payment, could be
made any time without notice to or consent by the guarantors, and that
the complained of changes were, therefore, binding upon the guarantors. 76
74. Raskin v. Otten, 273 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
75. Van Valkenberg v. Chris Craft Indus., Inc., 252 So. 2d 280 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971).
76. Chris Craft Indus., Inc. v. Van Valkenberg, 267 So. 2d 642 (Fla. 1972). The reader is
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An interesting application of the law of suretyship was presented in
Commercial Bank v. Andersen.77 A couple purchased a tractor and the
purchase price was secured by a note and a security agreement. The
couple subsequently sold the tractor, and the purchaser assumed in writ-
ing to pay the balance of the payments. The purchaser subsequently de-
faulted in his payments, and the bank agreed to waive its right to accel-
erate the remaining indebtedness if the purchaser would make interest
payments. When the final payment of principal became due, the bank
accelerated the indebtedness, foreclosed and sold the tractor. A deficiency
resulted, and the bank sought to hold both the original and subsequent
purchasers liable for the deficiency. The court held that when the sub-
sequent purchaser assumed the indebtedness, he, in relationship to the
original purchasers, became the principal debtor and they became sure-
ties, but that this change of relationship could have no effect on the
lender-bank. The fact that the bank accepted payments of interest could
not turn the extension of payments into a novation and thereby release
the original purchasers. With all due respect to the court, the court
missed the mark. The issue was not one of novation, but one of surety-
ship law-if the creditor extends or modifies the obligation of the prin-
cipal debtor without the consent of the surety (or without reserving
rights against the surety) the surety is released. 8
When the consideration for both a promissory note and the guar-
naty is the same, a partial failure of consideration is a defense to the
guarantor. 79
When a guarantor guarantees a line of credit to be extended to a
corporation by a bank upon condition that the bank secures the corpora-
tion's accounts receivable as the primary collateral for the loan, the bank
may not recover against the guarantor when it is unable to show that
it complied with the condition.8"
IV. BANKS AND SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS
A. Payment and Collection of Items
Under section 4-202 (1) (a) of the UCC, a collecting bank must use
ordinary care in presenting or sending a check for payment. In Florida
National Bank v. Exchange Bank,8' a depositary bank sent a counter
check which had not been encoded with the drawee-payor bank's code
cautioned that the supreme court's use of the term "alteration" in the holding is very ques-
tionable. The court confused alteration of the instrument (in the sense of physical changes
in the writing itself---see section 3-407 of the UCC) with "alteration" as used in a suretyship-
guarantyship setting, meaning a change in the principal obligation by subsequent agreement
without any physical changing of the original writing.
77. 260 So. 2d 871 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972).
78. UCC § 3-606 and comments.
79. Schaufelberger v. Mister Softee, Inc., 259 So. 2d 175 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972).
80. Northwestern Bank v. Cortner, 275 So. 2d 317 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973).
81. 277 So. 2d 313 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1973).
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number to a collecting bank. The collecting bank made a mistake and
wrote the wrong encoded number on the check. As a result, it reached
the wrong bank, which mailed it back to the collecting bank. The check
was then lost in the mails. If the check had been properly presented to
the drawee-payor bank it would have been paid. It was not paid, and
the collecting bank charged the amount of the check back against the
account of the depositary bank, which then sued the collecting bank.
The majority of the court held that the proximate cause of the loss was
not the mistake in encoding, but rather it was the negligence of the
United States mails. The majority of the court then overturned a jury
verdict in favor of the depositary bank. The dissent was of the view
that a jury could find that had the collecting bank not committed the
error in encoding, the check would have been presented to the drawee-
payor bank, and it would have been paid.
In a case of first impression, the District Court of Appeal, First
District, has held that a depositary-collecting bank is not liable to the
drawer of a check when the bank deposits only a part of the check
to the account of the corporate payee and cashes the remainder of
the check upon instructions from the officers, directors and sole
stockholders of the corporate payee. The holding was based upon the
following grounds: (1) That portion of the check which was turned into
cash actually reached the corporate payee, hence no loss was suffered
by the drawer because all of the proceeds of his check actually reached
the corporate payee. (2) In accordance with authority from other states,
a drawer of a check has no direct cause of action against banks other
than the drawee-payor bank. There is no conversion action by the drawee
because the beneficial interest in the check is in the payee and not the
drawer. The drawer has no cause of action against the collecting bank for
moneys had and received because if the payment of the check by the
drawee-payor is wrongful as to the drawer, then the drawee-payor bank
has paid out its own funds to the collecting bank and no loss has been
suffered by the drawer. (3) The warranty of the collecting bank does not
run to the drawer of the check, but only to other collecting banks and
the drawee-payor bank.8 2
Under sections 3-417(2)(b), 4-207(2)(b) and 4-207(3) of the
UCC, a collecting bank warrants to the drawee-payor bank that all
signatures are genuine or authorized. Hence, when a drawer issued two
checks made payable to "Firebird International, Inc.," both checks were
indorsed by a person who indorsed as president of this nonexistent com-
pany, and the drawer then successfully recovered the amount of the
checks from the drawee-payor bank, the drawee bank may then recover
over against the depositary-collecting bank."8
A bank which has made an oral agreement with one of its customers
82. Jett v. Lewis State Bank, 277 So. 2d 37 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1973).
83. First Bank & Trust Co. v. County Nat1 Bank, 281 So. 2d 515 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
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to allow him the right to draw against uncollected checks may revoke
this agreement without notice to the customer; this is particularly true
when the agreement resulted in an amount of credit in excess of the
legal loan limits under federal law and the bank has changed its man-
agement.8
4
Section 9-207 of the UCC provides that a secured party must use
reasonable care in the custody and preservation of collateral in his pos-
session. In Tallahasee Bank & Trust Company v. Bryant 5 warrants for
the purchase of stock were pledged with a bank by a borrower. The
stock warrants had to be exercised within a certain date or they became
worthless. The borrower, with the consent of the bank, sold 7,200 of the
8,200 warrants which were pledged. The bank did not inform the bor-
rower of the remaining 1,000 warrants; however, the borrower had rec-
ords which disclosed that he owned these 1,000 warrants. The bank
failed to sell the warrants and they became worthless. The borrower sued
the bank, and the trial court held in favor of the borrower. The appel-
late court held that section 9-207 did not cast an absolute duty upon the
bank to inform the borrower of their existence. It was a jury question
as to whether the bank was negligent for failing to inform and whether
the borrower was precluded from asserting negligence on the part of the
bank by his knowledge or what he should have known.
Funds which are in escrow are not subject to garnishment unless
all of the conditions of the escrow have been met and the funds are
absolutely due to the judgment debtor."
B. Joint Accounts
When a wife draws a check on the spouses' joint checking account
to the order of a payee who deposits the check in his bank in Nassau
County, which subsequently collects from the drawee bank in Palm
Beach County after the death of the wife, the surviving husband's cause
of action against the collecting payee is properly laid in Palm Beach
County, the place of payment, rather than in Nassau County, where the
depositary bank is located.8
The District Court of Appeal, First District, has held that when
bank and savings and loan accounts are established in the name of a
husband and wife as joint tenants with the right of survivorship, the
wife has the right without the knowledge or consent of her husband to
close out the accounts and to give the proceeds to her niece, thereby
cutting off any right of recovery from the niece.88
In order to prove a gift inter vivos to a wife of a joint share ac-
84. Radionoff v. First Nat'l Bank, 281 So. 2d 530 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
85. 271 So. 2d 190 (Fa. 1st Dist. 1972).
86. Cosentino v. Elson, 263 So. 2d 253 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
87. Blair v. Davis, 281 So. 2d 247 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973).
88. Simpson v. Schoenemann, 263 So. 2d 854 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972).
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count in a credit union, it is necessary to prove that the donor had dona-
tive intent at the time he opened the account. Hence, that the signature
card was signed only by the husband, that the account was in existence
for approximately ten years without any deposits or withdrawals by the
wife, who was seemingly unaware of the account, coupled with the fact
that the husband bequeathed the account to his wife and his five sons,
show that the husband did not have the requisite donative intent."9
C. Administrative Proceedings
Under the Supremacy Clause of article VI of the Constitution of
the United States, the federal government has preempted the regulation
and supervision of federal savings and loan associations. As a result, a
state court does not have jurisdiction to enjoin a federal savings and
loan association from proceeding before the Federal Home Loan Bank
Board for permission to establish a branch office. 90
The procedures under section 665.441 of the Florida Statutes
(1971) which are necessary to process an application for a branch office
of a savings and loan association are quasi-executive or quasi-legislative
rather than quasi-judicial in character, and, therefore, the Administra-
tive Procedure Act9' does not apply to the proceedings. 2
An order of the Comptroller which approves the application of a
savings and loan association for a branch office is quasi-executive or
quasi-legislative in nature and the district court of appeal is without
authority to review this order by an original proceeding in common law
certiorari. The Comptroller will therefore be entitled to a writ of pro-
hibition to prohibit the district court of appeal from proceeding. 3
D. Legislation-Savings and Loan Associations
Section 665.032 has been added to the Savings and Loan Act, and
provides for the imposition of fees and assessments on applications and
examinations of savings and loan associations. 4
In accordance with the addition of section 665.215 of the Florida
Statutes, any savings and loan association incorporated under the laws
of Florida may, with the approval of the Department of Banking and
Finance, "make any loan or investment or exercise any such power
which such association could make if it were incorporated and operating
as a federal association domiciled in this state."9 5
89. Williams v. Williams, 255 So. 2d 273 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971).
90. Washington Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Balaban, 281 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 1973).
91. FA. STAT. ch. 120 (1973).
92. Dickinson v. Washington Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 281 So. 2d 603 (Fla. 3d Dist.
1973).
93. Dickinson v. Judges of the Dist. Ct. of App., First Dist., 282 So. 2d 168 (Fla. 1973).
94. Fla. Laws, 1973, ch. 73-49, creating FLA. STAT. § 665.032.
95. Fla. Laws, 1973, ch. 73-225, creating FLA. STAT. § 665.215.
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Savings and loan associations may now invest in bankers' accep-
tances which are eligible for purchase by federal reserve banks; may
make reasonable charges for early withdrawals of classified savings ac-
counts; may make inducements not in excess of $15.00 for the opening
or increasing of savings accounts; and with authorization of the Depart-
ment of Banking and Finance may operate facilities other than a home
office or branch office "which will increase the viability of such associa-
tion in promoting thrift and home financing.""6
The Savings Association Act was amended to permit (among other
things) savings associations to classify their customers' savings accounts
according to the character, amount or duration thereof and to pay differ-
ing rates of interest which shall not exceed three percent over the rate of
earnings paid on all savings accounts based on such calculations. The
amendments also permit state and federal mutual associations to con-
vert to capital stock associations and allow the conversion of Florida
stock associations to federal associations. 7
The annual meeting of members of a savings association shall now
be held during the first three months of the fiscal year at a time fixed
by the bylaws of the association.98
Under an amendment to section 665.321 of the Florida Statutes,
virtually all fiduciaries, corporations, municipalities, etc., may now invest
funds held by them in savings accounts of savings associations which
are under state supervision, and in accounts of federal savings associa-
tions. In addition, these savings deposits are now legally acceptable in
any case where state laws provide for the deposit of securities for any
purpose, and, when the law provides for a bond with security, these sav-
ings deposits shall be acceptable as security.9
E. Legislation-Banks
Section 659.06 of the Florida Statutes was amended to provide
that commercial banks, with prior written approval of the Department
of Banking and Finance, may operate one drive-in and walk-up facility
within one mile of the main banking building in order to relieve burdens
on the public because of traffic congestion. A similar privilege was ex-
tended to industrial savings banks. 00
Under a 1972 amendment to chapter 659 of the Florida Statutes,
it is now unlawful for a bank, trust company or holding company whose
operations are principally conducted outside of the state of Florida to
96. Fla. Laws, 1973, ch. 73-285, amending FLA. STAT. §§ 665.361, .191(4), .441(3), .101,
.231(5) (1971) ; creating FLA. STAT. § 665.442.
97. Fla. Laws, 1973, ch. 73-224, amending FLA. STAT. §§ 665.021(6), .021(13), .031(5),
.041(1), .331; creating FLA. STAT. §§ 665.021(25), .701-.717.
98. Fla. Laws, 1973, ch. 73-168, amending FLA. STAT. § 665.091(1) (1971).
99. FLA. STAT. § 665.321 (Supp. 1972).
100. Fla. Laws, 1973, ch. 73-103, amending FLA. STAT. § 659.06(2) (1971).
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acquire or retain directly or indirectly all or substantially all of the assets
or control of any trust company (or a company which furnishes invest-
ment advisory services to trust companies) having a place of business
in this state. The act provides for exemptions in certain cases.Y 1
Extensive amendments were made to the statutes governing state
income taxation of banks and savings associations; space limitations do
not permit any discussion of these changes.'0 2
Under an amendment to section 659.061 of the Florida Statutes,
any Florida trust company may now operate "trust service offices" in
any bank which is organized under Florida or federal law with its prin-
cipal place of doing business in Florida, provided that it secures the con-
sent of the majority of stockholders and directors of these banks and
the approval of the Department of Banking and Finance. 3
Section 658.08 of the Florida Statutes was amended to provide for
the imposition of and increase in the amount of various application fees
for banks, and section 656.22 was amended to provide that these same
fees are applicable to industrial savings banks.0
F. Bad Check Laws
The crime of forgery has not been committed when a man opens
a checking account under an assumed name and utters worthless checks
signed with this assumed name with the intent to defraud the payee;
forgery requires the writing of a name which purports to be the writing
of another. The act of signing a worthless check under an assumed name
will, however, constitute the crime of obtaining property in return for
a worthless check. 0 5
101. FLA. STAT. § 659.141 (Supp. 1972).
102. Fla. Laws, 1973, ch. 73-152, amending FLA. STAT. §§ 220.62, .63, .64, .65 (Supp.
1972); creating FLA. STAT. §§ 220.67, .68, .69 (1973); amending FLA. STAT. § 665.501(4)
(1971).
103. Fla. Laws, 1973, ch. 73-119, amending FLA. STAT. § 659.061(1) (a) (1971).
104. Fla. Laws, 1973, cl. 73-69, amending FA. STAT. §§ 658.08(3)-(4) (1971).
105. Rap v. State, 274 So. 2d 18 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973).
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